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Empirical victimology is concerned both with the study of people’s experiences of crime 
victimisation and of the people who experience crime victimisation (i.e. victims). As such, it 
is fraught with conceptual problems, though many of these often tend to be over-looked or 
remain unexamined in empirical research. Most forms of social activity involve people 
interacting with their environment and crime victimisation is no exception. Each crime 
victimisation event is embedded within, and sets in train, complex webs of social action and 
meaning, stretching backwards and forwards in time for the people involved, and intersecting 
with the lives of others. Crime events also occur in specific instances of space-time – 
including ‘cyberspace’.  Yet we cannot readily observe the complexities and ramifications of 
these events and their settings – not just in the sense of being unable to observe people’s 
motives towards them or their interpretations of them, but even being able to capture the full 
complexity of the systems of social interaction that converge upon and are brought about by 
the act itself. So, the data that we have to work with are typically only partial selections from 
these complexities, focussing on limited slices of time-space in which such events occur and, 
at any one time, usually upon only one of the many parties to the event – in this case, the 
crime’s immediate victim. Inevitably, then, there are considerable difficulties of 
interpretation and inference, including problems of partiality, bias and distortion, raised by 
the essential selectivity of the available data.  
 
This chapter sets out to review what we might know about the distribution of the general 
populations’ experiences of crime victimisation from the data we have available. The term 
‘general population’ is used here not necessarily in any normative or ‘statistically average’ 
sense but as a catch-all term to mean any population or group of people from which it is 
possible in principle to select a representative sample for study. Again, though, empirical 
research encounters the problem of selectivity. Studies of victims and victimisation (both of a 
quantitative and qualitative nature) invariably have been opportunistic, in the sense that they 
have sought to understand people’s crime victimisation experiences from data usually 
assembled for other primary purposes: for example, from the respondents of social surveys 
designed to count crime, or amongst the users of social and clinical programmes and 
interventions. In this sense, much that we know empirically about victims is the result of 
secondary analysis of these data sources. It is rare indeed to encounter studies that set out 
specifically to investigate the phenomenology of crime victimisation, or test explanatory 
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hypotheses derived a priori from theory. Yet the selectivity and partiality engendered by the 
usual circumstances in which data is acquired (see Hope, 2005) also continues to limit the 
capacity of empirical research to support explanations of crime victimisation. Consequently, 
this chapter is as much concerned to describe some of the problems for explanation that arise 
from the various processes of selection which underpin the generation of data, as it is to 
advance explanation of the phenomenon of crime victimisation risk itself. Its emphasis is 
upon exploring what is, or should be, entailed in specifying hypothetical models that might be 
useful for exploring and describing the data generating processes (dgp) that presumably 
might underlie the observable data on crime victims and their experiences that are available. 
 
SOME PROBLEMS OF STUDYING AETIOLOGY 
 
Since there is no objective, impartial nor universally-applicable way of defining who is or 
who is not a ‘victim’ (as discussed in many contributions to this volume), and thus no agreed 
system for counting or measuring victims, it might be thought futile or disingenuous to 
proceed any further (as many do), especially to explore the distribution of victims within 
particular populations. Be that as it may, even where we might be reasonably confident on 
measurement issues – for instance, that persons who are prompted in the context of 
questionnaire surveys to report their experiences, broadly understand the questions put, and 
give truthful answers, and that our interpretations of these answers conform to commonly 
agreed notions as to what a victimisation event might look like - even so, substantial issues of 
selection bias remain to confront attempts at explanation. These reflect the fundamental 
conceptual and operational difficulty of framing and estimating the counter-factual condition 
for crime victimisation events, compounded by the consensus that such events are 
experienced as part of the victim’s everyday or normal life (regardless of whether or not this 
might seem ‘abnormal’ to anyone else). The source of this difficulty stems from the problem 
posed for causal attribution by the nature of observation itself: namely, in this case, that an 
individual cannot be observed (or rather self-reported to have been) in both a victimised and a 
non-victimised condition simultaneously. We only have available the ‘fact’ (i.e. 
victimisation) but we cannot observe its precise ‘counter-factual’. That is, since we cannot 
observe what would have happened if crime victimisation had not happened (i.e. the counter-
factual condition); we have no empirically certain means of knowing what factors ‘caused’ 
the specific occurrence of the crime victimisation event. Because the counter-factual remains 
unobservable for ‘singular events’ of victimisation, we cannot evaluate the actual probability 
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of the event in question occurring against the unactualised probability of it not occurring1.  
 
The empirical social sciences, including the empirical study of victims, have sought generally 
to overcome this kind of problem by inference, particularly through observing regularities 
from variation in supposedly temporal antecedents of events or statuses, in order to deduce 
causal antecedents. In this, they are following Hume in the empirical tradition of causality 
(Russell, 1946; 2005: 603-612).  With regard to victims, the method seeks to infer the causal 
antecedents of the likelihood of a person becoming a crime victim by tracing the biographical 
pathways leading towards crime events, or through comparison with ‘non-victims’, and 
preferably both. Nevertheless, for all its operationalisability, for a number of reasons the 
approach does not fully overcome the counterfactual problem with regard to the causes of 
crime victimisation:  
 
1. Since it is generally felt that there is no a priori condition that leads axiomatically to 
crime victimisation2, the acquisition of the status of ‘crime victim’ comes from people’s 
actual experiences of crime victimisation, over variably defined segments of their life-
courses. Crime-victimhood is thus a status that is attached to people retrospectively, 
occasioned by the occurrence of a crime victimisation event; people become victims, 
attaining a status and label that they did not have before. Yet if we simply looked back 
over the circumstances of people’s lives that lead up to the event, we would be likely to 
risk teleological fallacy. This is because we would risk selecting only those past events 
that actually occurred (assuming they were recalled) and would have no means of 
evaluating whether they were the real reasons that lead up to the event, since we could not 
compare the observed routines and pathways with all the possible counterfactual 
alternatives that the victim could have taken but did not, for whatever reasons (including 
those that we would want to uncover).  
  
2. A conventional scientific way of overcoming this problem is through some kind of 
prospective longitudinal ‘experiment’. In this case, such an experiment would set up 
conditions whereby people were randomly exposed (or not) to conditions that are 
presumed likely to give rise to a victimisation event. In the pure experimental design, 
those persons assigned to non-exposed conditions represent the counterfactual condition 
because the process of random assignment to the ‘exposed’ and ‘non-exposed’ conditions 
means that members of either group are ‘exchangeable’ and that the subsequently 
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observed differences between the two represents the difference between the factual and 
the counterfactual, and hence indicates causation (Hernán and Robins, 2006). Of course, 
such a research strategy risks rejection on ethical grounds in the case of crime 
victimisation, entailing as it would do the contrived exposure of human subjects to 
potential harm. Paradoxically, any experiment that contrived to minimise the risk of harm 
– say by somehow simulating victimisation in laboratory settings or other similarly 
constrained environments – would risk losing generalisability since such a set-up would 
be an artificial abstraction from the conditions in which the phenomenon of crime 
victimisation is embedded, that is, within everyday life.  
 
3. Paradoxically, experiments that seek to expose people to benefits – in this case exposing 
people to conditions that would protect them against crime victimisation, likewise cannot 
be used to infer antecedent causes, if these are unknown, since they risk confounding the 
causes of the ‘dependent variable’ (i.e. crime victimisation) with the ‘causes’ of the 
intervention. For instance, an hypothetical experiment that offered intruder alarms for 
purchase to randomly selected households would not be able to assess the protective 
effect of alarms since it is known both that more affluent households are likely to 
purchase alarms and that they are less likely to be victimised from household property 
crime (Hope, 2002). Thus, in this case, it would be the condition of ‘affluence’ rather than 
the condition of ‘alarm’ that was the causal antecedent of victimisation. And ‘affluence’ 
would then confound observation of the effect of ‘alarm’, even though the experimental 
set-up was predicated on testing the latter effect. Again, the difficulty of abstracting 
victimisation from the realm of everyday life in which it is embedded makes it hard to 
identify its causal antecedents. 
 
4. Given these problems, empirical research into the antecedents of crime victimisation has 
had to be content with inferential (statistical) methods of association – typically between 
victims and non-victims (as defined by self-reported admissions) – in order to estimate 
effects, usually by setting non-victimisation as the counterfactual condition. Yet as 
discussed below, this seemingly commonsensical model may well be a misleading 
depiction of the dgp of crime victimisation leading to mis-specification and mis-
identification of explanatory models.  
 
5. Some compensation might be had by building ‘controls’ into the design and analysis of 
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studies of observed data: for example, to establish temporal order (from which to infer 
causation) by implementing longitudinal ‘panel’ designs (i.e. repeated measurement on 
the same people at different points in time) and/or to control for extraneous or 
confounding effects by utilising appropriate, multivariate statistical models. Regrettably, 
longitudinal panel data is rarely available on victimisation3; ironically, an absence that 
severely hampers investigation of processes that have been seen of much policy-
relevance, such as repeat  (sic) victimisation – a concept that clearly implies a temporal 
causal ordering (but see Hope and Trickett, forthcoming; 2004).  
 
Thus, much of the available empirical data for studying the aetiological circumstances of 
crime victims are to be found in cross-sectional sample surveys. Since, as discussed below, 
the average prevalence of crime victims in populations (at least over periods of 12-months or 
less), is relatively low, large-scale samples are necessary, perforce leading to reliance upon 
government-supported surveys, often with national coverage such as the US National Crime 
Victimization Survey, or the British Crime Survey for England and Wales. Notwithstanding 
the fact that these surveys may lack adequate sets of measures of covariates of theoretical 
(aetiological) interest, due to possible conflicts with their public service functions 4, all cross-
sectional survey data remain vulnerable, nevertheless, to three kinds of selection bias:  
 
1. Sample selection bias arising from failure of eligibility for inclusion in the sampling 
process;  
2. Response bias arising from the failure of those selected to participate in answering 
some or any of the questions either accurately, truthfully or at all (for summaries of 
commonly observed sample and response biases see Hope, 2005; Mayhew, 2000); 
and  
3. Conditional selection bias. This latter form of selection bias (sometimes called 
conditional censoring) again reflects the concerns of the counterfactual approach. As 
discussed below, in the case of testing theories of crime victimisation which rest upon 
the notion that people might be differentially exposed to the chance of becoming a 
victim, it is necessary to distinguish between those who are never likely to be exposed 
to the risk of crime, for example, because they never go out on foot, or to places 
where they might encounter street-robbers, from those that are so exposed to crime-
risk but nevertheless do not become victimised (see Clarke et al., 1985).  
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Generally, counterfactual reasoning suggests that explanatory models are likely to be 
incomplete, mis-specified or biased to the extent that they fail substantively to take each of 
these sources of selection bias into account (Heckman, 2001).  
 
In sum, the nature of the available data, combined with the ex post facto, event-referenced 
nature of the definition of ‘crime victim’, present formidable problems for researching the 
aetiology of the condition of crime victimhood. Such research has had to proceed empirically 
by the method of statistical association, from which inferences about underlying data 
generation and aetiological processes might be deduced. Counterfactual reasoning suggests 
that such methods of empirical analysis are likely not only to be causally-weak (because of 
the difficult of identifying satisfactory conditional counterfactuals) but may also lead to 
erroneous or biased results, - which might only be overcome, partially at least, by careful 
attention to ex ante theoretical development, model specification (including an incorporation 
of selection bias) and data collection. Nevertheless, empirical analysis of this kind has 
continued over the past thirty-odd years, though the difficulties and inconsistencies 
encountered in interpreting its results have been disappointing, on the whole, arguably 
through inattention to the issues of causal analysis identified here.    
 
SPECIFYING THE DATA GENERATING PROCESS 
 
Sample surveys of general populations generate counts of crime-victimisation events 
experienced by their respondents. Typically they ask their respondents to report the numbers 
of incidents of a set of offences that they or their households have experienced over a 
particular recall period (usually no more than the previous 12 months). Naturally, tabulations 
of responses to such questions yield frequency distributions for the number of crime 
victimisations experienced by the sampled respondents. Typically also, those experiencing 
one or more incidents over the recall period are usually considered to be ‘victims’, and thus 
distinguished from non-victims (i.e. people not reporting any incidents), while persons 
reporting more than one incident have come to be termed ‘multiple victims’ or, following 
Farrell and Pease (1993), ‘repeat victims’. Because the surveys are representative samples, so 
also have these categories come to be thought of as representative of the crime victimisation 
experiences of the general population 5. Since the surveys also ask a range of other questions 
about respondents’ background, experiences and so on, these questions have been correlated 
with crime victimisation frequencies and, in turn, have been considered as covariate proxies 
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of causal antecedents, used to support, substantiate or test various explanatory theories of 
crime victimisation.  
 
When  the sampled count data of self-recalled crime victimisation are arranged as a frequency 
distribution, they invariably display two characteristics: first, that crime victimisation seems 
to be a probabilistically rare event – that is, the majority of the sampled population do not 
report victimisation over the recall period; and second, the population distribution is over-
dispersed – that is, the sample variance exceeds the sample mean, for example, that there are 
more higher-frequency crime victims than would be expected,  or conversely, that the zero 
response observation is over-inflated (see below).  Table 1a and b shows that these 
characteristics appear across a variety of types of crime and types of victim. The similarity 
suggests that there might be a similar data generating process (dgp) underlying these 
different frequency distributions. The difficulty, however, lies in finding out what such a dgp 
might look like. 
 
Table 1a-b about here 
 
The Data Generating Process 
 
While measurement issues are concerned with how we count crime victimisation, the form of 
the dgp is a particular stochastic process that best describes how the observed frequency 
distribution is produced. Any particular dgp cannot be observed itself but its presence and 
form can be identified by the degree to which a sample frequency distribution conforms to, or 
‘fits’, a particular theoretical statistical distribution.  If there is found to be a good fit , we can 
then infer that the unobserved dgp for the observed frequency distribution has the same 
general properties as the theoretical distribution which, in turn, provides us with basic  
building blocks for developing and testing  theories about the processes that produce the 
frequencies observed.  
 
In general, the dgp for crime victimisation distributions possesses three basic characteristics 
(Hope et al., 2001): first, repetition – that is, whether an observed frequency distribution 
implies a time-ordered sequence of crime victimisation events suffered by the same 
individual victim (which is the case in self-report, recall-based crime victimisation surveys); 
Second, specificity, that is, whether such an ordered sequence occurs within a specific crime 
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type or across crime types or both. Most research has focussed on victimisation within 
specific crime types. Exceptionally, Hope et al. (2001) model the conditional probabilities  
for cross-crime-type victimisation between household property crime and personal crime 
victimisation, also taking into account (self-reported) prior victimisation experiences of 
offences in both crime types. While the study is restricted to cross-sectional BCS data and 
cannot determine causal order between immediate victimisation experiences, it suggests a 
degree of generality present in crime victimisation experience: first, having taken into 
account covariate risk factors specific to each offence type (though there is also a degree of 
commonality in these too), there still remained a significant, positive association between the 
chance of becoming a property crime victim and that of becoming a victim of personal crime; 
and second, that prior victimisation experiences seem to affect immediate victimisation risk, 
both within (see also Ellingworth et al., 1997) and also across crime-types. 
 
This leads on to the third, and most elusive element, the existence and form of the mechanism 
of risk-transmission – that is, whether there is a non-random link between incidents suffered 
by the same individual over time and, if so, what might be the characteristics of the process 
linking incidents together? The Poisson model is regarded as the benchmark model for count 
data that consist of a number of discrete events occurring over a fixed time interval (Cameron 
and Trivedi, 1998).  The simple Poisson model assumes that successive events for any 
individual occur independently of each other over time at a constant rate. However, in the 
case of crime victimisation data this would mean that the probability of victimisation would 
be the same for all persons in the population and that the probability of being victimised 
would not depend upon the number of previous victimisations (Nelson, 1980: 871). Yet not 
only has much recent research on the aetiology of crime victimisation proceeded as though 
neither of these conditions were true (see below) but the observable properties of the 
frequency distribution, particularly its over-dispersion, violate the assumptions of the simple 
Poisson distribution, leading to an extremely poor fit. Thus, early research on both American 
and British crime victimisation surveys suggested there was a need for an alternative to the 
simple-Poisson process that might be producing the underlying distribution of  the observed 
condition of crime victimisation (Nelson, 1980; Sparks et al, 1977). Yet, it has not been 
established precisely what form the dgp for the distribution actually takes. Empirically, there 
have been various strategies taken to overcome this problem when seeking to estimate 
covariates to stand as proxies for causal influences or risk factors.  
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The discrete outcome model 
 
By far the most common approach taken to date has been to conceptualise the distribution as 
a ‘discrete outcome’ model6 where the observed frequency distribution is truncated into two 
outcomes: typically, zero to indicate non-victimisation, and a positive value (usually 1) to 
indicate victimisation frequencies of one or more incidents over the recall period – commonly 
designated as ‘victim’. This approach has a number of advantages: it conforms to ‘common-
sense’ and policy priorities – that is, interest in the process of acquiring the status of victim; it 
reflects legal distinctions that operate on an individual case-basis, which assigns status to the 
different parties to a criminal event (i.e. ‘victim’ and ‘offender’); and it obviates the problem 
of the uncertain nature of the underlying dgp by converting it into a simple discrete binary 
outcome. It also capitalises on empirical observation – that the majority of sampled 
populations are not victimised over the typical recall period (Tables 1a-b). Thus, by 
truncating the positive values of the count of  victimisation incidents, the discrete outcome 
approach brings the average risk rate, called prevalence (defined as the number of 
victimisation incidents divided by the number in the sampled population), closer to an 
assumed true mean of the distribution, approximating to zero. The approach removes the 
explanatory problems posed by over-dispersion by ignoring the contribution to explanation of 
the statistically rare sub-population of higher-frequency ‘multiple victims’, thereby 
‘normalising’ the distribution, ‘fixing’ the dgp,  and thus making the distribution easier to 
analyse, without apparently much loss to explanation (Nelson, 1980).  
 
The theoretical assumption of the discrete outcome approach is thus to focus on the ‘normal’ 
condition – that is, close to a zero likelihood of victimisation for the majority of the 
population. Victimisation is thus conceptualised as a deviation from normality – a relatively 
rare risk that individuals encounter in their daily lives and routine activities. The empirical 
task is thus to look for those risk factors present in the environments in which people 
normally find themselves (Miethe and Meier, 1994). The primary reason for asking the 
question in this way is to identify the factors that might contribute to, and thus predict on the 
basis of  a priori risk, the general population’s likelihood of exposure to crime victimisation – 
an approach first developed by Hindelang, Gottfredson and Garofalo in their book Victims of 
Violent Crime (1978). To the extent to which patterns are found, this indicates the risk of 
exposure to the likelihood of crime victimisation that is part of the structure of the social 
environment. The null hypothesis (the counter-factual) is thus that crime victimisation – in 
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the rare chance that it should occur – is a random event, at least from the point of view of the 
victim. This approach has been termed positivist victimology reflecting an empirical strategy 
of analysing population distributions in terms of deviations from norms, with the theoretical 
intention of identifying and explaining what those norms might be (Mawby and Walklate, 
1994). 
 
Exposure to risk 
 
Central to the discrete outcome empirical approach is the concept of exposure to risk. Bearing 
in mind the conventional ex post facto definition of victim status, it is not surprising that 
when first encountering these distributions, researchers gravitated towards the concept of 
exposure – that persons who became victims did so because they were likely to be exposed to 
criminogenic risks, typically through social and/or physical propinquity to the carriers of the 
‘disease of crime’, that is, those who offend  (Hindelang, Gottfredson and Garofalo, 1978). In 
part, this may have arisen because criminology came first, reflecting a primary preoccupation 
with explaining crime and offending (Lauritsen and Laub, 2006). Thus, it was assumed that 
the observed distribution of crime victimisation mirrored the data generating process of 
differential exposure to criminogenic sources and conditions in the population. Further 
support for this assumption came from Cohen and Felson’s (1979) specification of the 
necessary conditions for the occurrence of criminal incidents 7. The probability of these 
convergences occurring could be explained primarily by reference to common,  socially-
structured routine activity patterns, such as travelling to work, leaving dwellings unoccupied, 
frequenting public spaces or places of entertainment. And these patterns could be extended to 
residential proximity to neighbourhoods also plentiful in the supply of ‘offenders’ (Cohen et 
al., 1981).  
 
 Correspondingly, at the individual-level of analysis, a lifestyle explanation of exposure to 
criminal victimisation was originally proposed by Hindelang et al. (1978) as a way of 
accounting for apparently non-random differences in victimisation risk observed between 
different demographic groups (i.e. groups distinguished by age, gender, race, income, etc.) in 
survey data. In an effort to explain these observations, individuals' status characteristics - 
which are presumed to be measured by their demographic characteristics - were held to imply 
role expectations and structural constraints which result in differing routine activities and 
patterns of social relations. These activities and associations may also entail differing levels 
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of 'exposure' to others who might victimise them (Miethe and Meier, 1994). The analysis has 
been essentially inductive – with researchers seeking to provide ex post facto explanations for 
observations obtained from survey data 8.  
 
Within this tradition of research, four central concepts have been used to explain the risk of 
individual victimisation (Miethe and Meier, 1994): 
 
1. Proximity to crime. This might be thought of as the degree of permanent, physical 
proximity to places where offences might be committed. Risks of victimisation may be 
heightened in many kinds of place where people who are likely to commit crimes might 
congregate, and where circumstances are conducive to their being encouraged to commit 
crimes (Cohen and Felson, 1979); in the residential context, proximity is generally taken to 
mean a victim's residence in an area which is also likely to have a high rate of resident 
offenders whom it is presumed may be likely to victimise their fellow residents. 
 
2. Exposure to crime. Aside from physical propinquity, certain individuals and households 
may also have a heightened risk of victimisation by virtue of their lifestyles and routine 
activities which provide them with additional exposure to the likelihood of risk. Their routine 
activities and lifestyle choices may take them to risky places, or amongst dangerous people 
(as in the proximity hypothesis), and may take them away from the location of their 
residential and mobile property, which then becomes more exposed to the risk of 
expropriation or damage. Alternatively, their routines might allow them to avoid such risks. 
 
3. Attractiveness. In addition to proximity and exposure, some targets (property or persons) 
may be seen by offenders as more attractive or worthwhile to attack or steal than other 
targets. Possibly, it may be the different values or subjective utilities attached to particular 
targets within a range of suitably 'exposed' targets in any residential community which shapes 
the decisions of offenders to select particular targets (Miethe and Meier, 1994).     
 
4. Capable guardianship. Finally, targets may or may not be selected depending upon the 
degree of effective protection – what Cohen and Felson (1979) call capable guardianship - 
which is available to them. Such protection might take the form of physical security 
measures, and activities by residents or owners carried out either individually (i.e. locking-up, 
keeping a dog) or collectively (i.e. participating in watching actions with neighbours). 
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Individuals may also benefit from guardianship 'services' available collectively in the locales 
in which they find themselves, including physical-environmental opportunities facilitating 
surveillance (i.e. street-layout, building design, street-lighting), informal surveillance by other 
residents, organised citizen surveillance (block watches, citizen patrols), and public or private 
police patrolling. 
 
Is crime victimisation risk a discrete or continuous process? 
Much of the research effort which has sought to apportion individual likelihood of risk 
between these elements has been hampered by inadequacies both in the selection and 
measurement of indicators, the specification of appropriate analytical models, and underlying 
difficulties in conceptualising the way in which these effects might operate and the 
relationships between them (see Miethe and Meier, 1994). Research has tended to produced 
discrepancies and difficulties of interpretation, and it is difficult to work out whether these 
are substantive or merely artefactual. At least part of the difficulty may reside in 
conceptualising crime victimisation as a discrete, binary choice. If the underlying dgp for 
crime victimisation is actually a continuous process (or if there is actually a non-random link 
between events), then this cut-off point is essentially arbitrary. Other or more salient 
thresholds may exist than the distinction between no incidents and one incident, or that there 
might be an underlying continuous distribution with no empirically meaningful thresholds at 
all. Theoretically, the discrete outcome approach reifies the status of ‘victim’ as a stable 
quality at the expense of conceptualising the process of victimisation – which may be one 
reason for the apparent confusion of empirical research, or the lack of covariate consistency 
between samples.  
Osborn et al. (1996) specifically test the possibility that crime victimisation is a discrete or a 
continuous distribution by testing a ‘double-hurdle’ model of household property crime 
victimisation: first, the transition from non-victim to victim household; and second, whether 
the victimised household progressed to become a multiple (two or more) victim. It was 
assumed that the probability of a second or subsequent victimisation would not be 
independent of the probability of an initial victimisation. This allows both for the possibility 
of a contagious link between victimisation incidents (see below) and that the process of 
victimisation risk may be similar for each of the hurdles, that is, a continuous process of 
heightened exposure to risk. Having taken into account the (individual and area) risk factors 
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associated with the first hurdle, no further or additionally significant risk factors could be 
identified for the second hurdle (of repeat household crime victimisation). The inference was 
that there were no measured a priori predictors that would distinguish multiple victims from 
victims generally, other than those that are common to all victims and distinguish them from 
non-victims (Osborn et al., 1996). Two interpretations were invited by this result: first, that 
there might be unmeasured risk factors that would distinguish higher from lower frequency 
victims (Tseloni et al., 2002)9 – that is, that would substantiate a discrete outcome model with 
a further cut-off between ‘single’ and ‘multiple’ victims; but second, that there remained the 
probability that a victim experiencing higher frequency victimisation was dependent to some 
extent upon the initial (or rather a priori) risk of victimisation – that is, that victimisation was 
a continuous process.  
 
It is also theoretically possible that truncating the distribution at the zero (positive) value 
masks important qualitative distinctions amongst those classified as members of the ‘non-
victims’ sub-population. For example, there may be persons who, for various reasons, are not 
‘at risk’ of victimisation and those who are theoretically ‘at risk’ but who have not been 
victimised over the recall period. If the frequency distribution of crime victimisation is held 
to measure the risk of victimisation, then the zero category may also be masking both discrete 
differences – for example, those never likely to be at risk – and continuous differences – that 
is, those who depart with increasing degrees from the likelihood of being victimised; in this 
latter case, not only would the victimisation risk process be continuous but that there should 
also be negative exposure values on such a  victimisation risk continuum. Yet these cannot be 
observed empirically, especially if the risk continuum is measured by actual events of 
victimisation. Again, this points up the limitations to explanation of an inadequate or 
incomplete conceptualisation of the counter-factual (or antonym) to the experience of crime 
victimisation. So, while the measurement of victimisation can only be positive, the 
underlying dgp may be capable, theoretically, of producing unobservable negative risk 
values. As we shall return to below, the possibility not only of continuing, incremental risk 
but also of possible negative values, poses difficulties both for the discrete outcome model, 
and the concept of exposure that underpins it.  
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CONCEPTUALISING RISK 
 
The concept of exposure also presupposes that there is something that victims are exposed to 
– that risk is a property of their environment (rather than something intrinsic to them). 
Nevertheless, there are problems in conceptualising the role of environmental effects and 
how they might be distinguished from individual risk factors. For example, numerous 
empirical studies in both Britain and America, have found a correlation between lone 
(female-headed) household status and the risk of property crime victimization (Hope, 2001). 
A variable 'lone-parent household' is an individual-level characteristic, while a variable 
'proportion of single-parent households in the resident population of a neighbourhood' is a 
characteristic of an environment, in this case the residential neighbourhood in which the 
household is located. Correlations between rates of lone-parent households and rates of 
victimization have been found across neighbourhoods; and lone-parent households have also 
been found to be at greater risk of victimization compared to other household types.  
 
But what does this mean? Are these correlations indicators of: 
 
1. individual vulnerability - for example, lone-parents may have to leave their property 
unguarded more often because they go out to work (Cohen and Felson, 1979), or are 
victimised more often by intimates, including past and estranged partners (Maxfield, 1987; 
Tseloni, 1994; Genn,1988), or their children’s friends (Sampson and Lauritsen, 1990) ? In 
other words, are these correlations evidence of an essentially micro-level effect? or 
 
2. neighbourhood-level vulnerability -  for example, high proportions of lone-parent 
households in a neighbourhood might mean that there are fewer adults to carry out day-to-day 
surveillance of property (guardianship),  or to supervise local youth activities (social control) 
(Sampson and Groves, 1989). In other words, providing evidence of a macro-level effect; or 
even 
 
3. context-specific vulnerability -  for example, lone-parents who live in areas of 
predominantly lone parents are not only more vulnerable than other types of household (in 1, 
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above) but are also more vulnerable than single parents who live in other kinds of area (in 2 
above). Here, individual vulnerability is enhanced by the particular neighbourhood-level 
context of risk (Miether and McDowall, 1993). In other words, providing evidence of a 
macro-micro interaction effect. 
 
Why these different interpretations matter is that, if one or the other is true, and the others 
false, it would then help to support different theories of crime victimisation, particularly those 
that give different explanatory weight to one or the other levels of analysis. For example, if 
the true interpretation operated at the micro-level rather than the macro-level, it would be 
evidence of so-called life-style/routine activity theories of certain households’ and 
individuals’ (lone parents’) differential likelihood of exposure to criminal victimisation risk 
(Smith and Jarjoura, 1989; Maxfield, 1987). In contrast, the macro-level correlate could 
indicate diminished levels in the community of informal social control over children and 
teenagers, and would be supportive of theories of social disorganisation (Sampson and 
Groves, 1989; Sampson, 1985).  
 
Cross-level misspecification 
 
Yet the problem remains, in the example given above, that lone-parent household status 
appears related empirically to the risk of victimisation at both levels of analysis (Hope, 2001). 
So, how could we set about sorting out which one is right? In the context of differentiating 
whether an effect operates at the macro-level or the micro-level, we encounter the general 
theoretical problem of  cross-level misspecification – that is, of misinterpreting effects 
measured at one level as representing also explanations operating at another level, and vice 
versa (Sampson and Lauritsen, 1994), and thus committing errors of inference. Each source 
of variation - whether attributed to micro-level or macro-level sources - constitutes a threat to 
the validity of explanation couched at the other level.   
 
There are different kinds of potential cross-level misspecification error, depending on 
whether one is seeking to explain micro-level phenomena from macro-level observations, or 
vice versa. Mouzelis (1991) sees both of these as problems of reductionism (of reducing 
explanation to one or the other of the two levels), and are the pitfalls of methodological 
individualism. One type of reductionism – downward reductionism – lies in erroneously 
explaining micro-level phenomena from macro-level observation. Here one might encounter 
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two kinds of misspecification error:  
 
1. The ecological fallacy - that is, inferring that unobserved individual actions can be 
deduced from aggregate-level observations. Following Robinson's classic exposition 
(Robinson, 1950), it is possible to demonstrate logically that, say, an observed correlation 
between rates of lone-parent households and criminal victimisation at the macro-level does 
not necessarily mean that, within any given community, it is the lone-parent households who 
are being victimised more than other types of household.  
 
2. The contextual fallacy - that is, what might be asserted to be contextual effects - requiring 
macro-level explanations - may turn out to be merely unmeasured, residual variance at the 
micro-level which might have disappeared had the micro-level variables been better or more 
comprehensively measured. For example, that the capacities and abilities of families to 
supervise their teenaged children have not been properly measured. If they had, then the 
seemingly contextual effect produced by the lone parent proportion indicator could be 
explained by the distribution of families with variable supervision capabilities. 
 
Similarly, when seeking to move from micro-level evidence to macro-level explanation there 
is the risk of upward reductionism (Mouzelis , 1991), again in various forms: 
 
1. The aggregation fallacy – this is the opposite side of the coin from the contextual fallacy 
– that what might purport to be genuine contextual (macro-level) effects are merely biased 
aggregations of individual-level measurement. For example, in a frequently-cited study, 
Sampson and Groves (1989) aggregate data collected from individual respondents in the 
British Crime Survey and, taking advantage of its sampling design, aggregate these response 
together to form macro-level data on ‘pseudo-communities’. Thus, they derive contextual 
variables – such as the presence of teenagers on the streets – from respondents individual 
perceptions of neighbourhood teenagers as a problem. The risk in this approach is that the 
macro-level variables so constructed may compound the sampling error of the Survey, 
leading to biased estimates of the macro-level parameters used in analysis at  the macro-level 
– in preference, it may be better to use genuinely contextual variables about the area in which 
the respondents lived, derived from an independent source, such as the national Census 
(Osborn et al. (1992). Unfortunately, in this case, the Census does not contain information on 
the kinds of concepts of substantive significance for Sampson and Groves’ (1989) analysis. 
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2. The individualistic fallacy – it follows from the aggregation fallacy that analysts may 
refuse to countenance that the effect of  a variable observed at the individual level, or based 
on an individual’s response,  is anything other than an attribute of the individual. In this 
sense, it assumes that what is important is the way that individuals interpret or respond to 
their environment, which can be gauged by asking or observing them, without needing to 
look at what it is in the environment that may be prompting, shaping or structuring their 
responses, nor at the role that the environment might play in mediating these influences to 
shape individual propensities to victimisation. In simple form, this may amount to saying that 
a neighbourhood crime rate is merely due to features of its population’s composition, such as 
the number of families that fail to supervise their teenage children. 
3. The selection-compositional fallacy - the chief threat of individual-level variance for 
macro-level explanation is that observed community-level variation may simply be the 
product of selective population composition. In other words, it may be that the differential 
selection of particular vulnerable individuals to certain communities may be the source of any 
observed community effects. Thus, systematic (macro-level) social selection processes could 
be the main way in which individuals with similar characteristics (such as propensity to crime 
victimisation) are brought together in specific spatial areas. If so, macro-level explanations 
would become substantively trivial or spurious, for what we might observe in the aggregate 
in neighbourhoods may be merely individual characteristics writ large - simply the 
compositional effect of bringing individuals together (Sampson and Lauritsen, 1994). Thus, 
neighbourhoods with high crime rates also have high rates of lone parent households, and 
many other problems besides, merely because they are unpopular or undesirable so that only 
‘problem populations’ find themselves living there, and thus express their problems, 
including youth crime and consequently victimisation. 
 
While we might suspect cross-level effects in cross-sectional data, we may be able to do little 
to sort out the appropriate levels of analysis. This problem is compounded by the inherent, 
socially structured heterogeneity of the social world that renders it impossible in natural 
settings to ‘abstract’ individuals from their environments 10. For example, Trickett, Osborn 
and Ellingworth (1995) estimate a multivariate statistical model of household property crime 
victimisation that includes both variables representing household characteristics (micro-level) 
and characteristics of households’ area of residence, taken from the Census (macro-level). 
Again, pursuing our illustration of the lone parent household, when the significant influence 
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of area-level variables on households’ likelihood of property crime victimisation is taken into 
account - including the separate influences of the proportions of adult residents who may be 
living as lone-parents, single-person households, and who are adult women; alongside other 
socio-economic and demographic indicators – we find that lone parent households do not 
have any greater risk of victimisation than any other type of household.    
 
While this example could be taken as evidence that households’ risk of property crime 
victimisation is a consequence of the social environment or context of different kinds of 
neighbourhood – and hence would seem to explain the apparently greater vulnerability of 
lone-parent households - it does not rule out a relationship between lone-parent household 
composition and crime rates, via social selection processes at the macro-level. Thus, using the 
same data, although this time aggregated to represent ‘pseudo-neighbourhoods’, Osborn, 
Trickett and Elder (1992) find not only that the proportion of lone-parent households is 
significantly related to area-level property crime rates but also that lone-parent households 
are likely to be found disproportionately in areas with other social characteristics related to 
crime rates, including a larger teenage/young adult population, single adult households, and 
households in non-self-contained accommodation; taken together the effect of these 
neighbourhood characteristics is substantial. Yet, in neither analysis does the data itself 
explain: 
 
1. the macro-level social-selection processes that allocate lone-parent households to 
particular kinds of neighbourhood;    
2. and why it is that such neighbourhoods with particular social compositions have an 
influence on the crime rates experienced there - i.e. a contextual (structural) influence 
that is not reducible simply to the fact that they may contain household types or 
individuals prone to be involved in crime in one way or another.  
 
Both these processes are relevant to shaping the crime victimisation rate at an observed 
macro-level but nevertheless involve different movements in explanation going from the 
macro-level to micro-level and back again. Thus, point (1) above, needs to explain a macro-
level observation by a process that links micro-level actors (lone-parent households) to 
macro-level locations (neighbourhoods); while point (2) is a process that seeks to interpret a 
macro-level observation by collective, micro-level processes – i.e. the effect of the 
compositional structure of the neighbourhood upon individual actions or events (offending or 
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victimisation). Not only do both require a theory but also the resulting explanations depend 
upon moving between the levels of analysis. Thus, a more complete explanation requires not 
only explanation at each level of analysis but also cross-level explanation that links each 
level with the other in a causal sequence (Coleman, 1990). Otherwise, it becomes very 
difficult to disentangle individual victimisation risks produced by environments from the 
contribution to risk that individuals make to their environments. 
 
UNDERSTANDING THE DATA GENERATING PROCESS 
 
An obstacle that has stood in the way of developing aetiological understanding of crime 
victims on the basis of the discrete outcome approach has been the perhaps unwarranted 
readiness of empirical researchers to make assumptions as to the nature of the dgp that might 
underpin observed frequency distributions, and thence to interpret covariate associations as 
indicators of aetiology in the light of their assumptions. The discrete outcome approach 
naturally leads to normalising the distribution around non-victimisation and focussing 
explanation on deviations from that condition. While, on the one hand, research suggests that 
there is nothing to distinguish a subsequent hurdle (of multiple victimisation) from the 
primary hurdle (Osborn et al, 1996), there nevertheless remained an unmeasured dependency 
between the probability of becoming a multiple victim and that of becoming a victim at all. 
Additionally, this study estimated that, irrespective of initial differences in risk, once 
victimised, the probabilities of subsequent victimisation converged. So while there may be 
only one hurdle (Between non-victim and victim), victimisation itself may be more of a 
continuous process – as indicated by the entire frequency distribution -  than the discrete 
outcome approach allows. 
 
As illustrated in Tables 1a and 1b, the discrete outcome approach recognises one part of the 
distribution – the preponderance of non-victimisation – that would seem common to all 
observed victimisation distributions, including inter-personal violence (Table 1a) and 
domestic violence (Table 1b). Yet it ignores the second consistent element of the distribution 
– the high frequency of victimisation of the apparent minority of ‘multiple victims’. Although 
these frequency rates differ between crime types – with property crime at one end of the 
spectrum and domestic violence at the other – the survey data nevertheless suggest a common 
pattern of multiple victimisation, ranging from a fifth of victims of burglary to around three-
quarters of victims of domestic violence Table 1a-b). Yet while the assumption of deviation 
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from normality inherent in the concept of exposure might fit common-sense explanations of 
household property crime – committed apparently by predatory strangers – they hardly fit 
common-sense understandings of acquaintance and domestic violence – committed by 
familiars who are party to a routine relationship, with persistent frequency of risk over time.  
 
Not surprisingly, from the outset, victimology has seen a polarisation between explanations 
of property crime, on the one hand, and domestic violence, on the other. Inter-personal 
violence has had an uneasy position between them, splitting primarily on the fact of the prior 
relationship between the two parties, resting on a distinction between ‘stranger’ and 
‘acquaintance’. While the discrete outcome empirical model has suited quantitative survey-
based methods, the study of  domestic violence has proceeded primarily on the basis of 
qualitative methods. Similarly, the discrete outcome model focuses exclusively on issues of 
onset – why people become victims, and completely ignores issues of process, including the 
duration of victimisation experience and its cessation (see Miether and Meier, 1994). In 
contrast, the latter are of paramount interest in the victimology of domestic violence. Issues 
of onset are at best irrelevant and at worst inappropriate, since domestic violence is a 
condition that develops after the ‘onset’ of a relationship. Ostensibly, different normative 
counterfactuals apply: in the case of domestic burglary, it is the expectation of privacy and 
protection from trespass that underpin property norms (Hope, 1999); in the case of  domestic 
violence, it is the social and cultural norms of intimate human relationships.  
 
Yet the empirical similarity of all observed crime victimisation distributions (Tables 1a and 
b) suggests that there might be a common data generating process uniting all forms of crime 
victimisation. Conceptually, what would be required for a general theory to express the 
commonality of the crime victimisation data generating process would be to bring the 
respective counter-factual conditions into common alignment. Yet, since it is both archaic 
and unacceptable to apply the norms of property relations to the conduct of interpersonal 
relationships 11, the only possible strategy to unite the two empirical traditions of victimology 
is to apply the norms of personal relationships to the explanation of property crime and 
‘stranger’ victimisation, especially to consider issues of victimisation duration and cessation, 
which have been central the study of domestic violence. 
 
The conceptual strategy that would need to be applied to property crime would be to mimic 
more precisely the ‘relational’ or processual characteristics found in the phenomenology of 
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domestic violence. Two broad strategies are possible: first, to focus on the duration of 
victimisation. Central to this line of enquiry is whether there could exist a property of 
contagion between victimisation events – that is, that the probability of one event influences 
the probability of subsequent events. This is the case in domestic violence where violence 
becomes established in a relationship and may escalate in severity as a result of repetition. A 
second strategy is to focus particularly on the conditions that lead to immunity – both those 
things that lead to the cessation of victimisation once it has started – for instance by removing 
victims to a place of refuge -  as well as those things that inhibit it from starting in the first 
place – which in the case of violence means addressing factors leading men to perpetrate 
violence in relationships.  
 
However, the specialism of victimology (as distinct from criminology) suggests that the focus 
remains upon individual victims and their specific time-space locations and trajectories. Part 
of the confusion that has grown up recently has been a result of shifting the focus away from 
the specific perspective of victims. For example, an interest in repeat victimisation can 
include an interest in working out relationships between victimisation incidents, particularly 
from a crime prevention perspective. Such studies may be concerned with whether there is 
any contagion between incidents occurring amongst neighbouring properties (e.g. Townsley 
et al. , 2003), or within residential areas (Morgan, 2001). Similarly, some (perhaps most) 
studies of repeat victimisation are concerned primarily to study the target-selection activities 
of offenders, again with a concern to intervene in these activities to reduce crime, again 
defined as consisting of the quantity of incidents (Pease, 1998; 1993; Farrall and Pease, 
1995). Yet these interests tend to divert attention away from exploring the position and 
agency of the victim, who remains a passive ‘host’ to these phenomena which are, strictly 
speaking, occurrences emanating from their external environment. But notwithstanding the 
conceptual and moral difficulties of introducing the concept of victims’ agency in their 
victimisation [see elsewhere in this volume], the aetiological analysis of victims necessarily 
requires some notion of victims’ agency, particularly how  victims interact with their 
environments. In so doing, it may be possible to move beyond the normative and explanatory 
inadequacies of the discrete outcome model of exposure to risk (Walklate, 1997). 
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True Contagion  
 
Many instances of count data, like those of crime victimisation (Table 1a-b), are 
characterised by over-dispersion. The standard parametric model used to account for over-
dispersion is the negative binomial model (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998), which Nelson found 
to have an “astoundingly good fit” to the observed sample distribution of crime victimisation 
(1981: 872). Yet, despite its empirical robustness, the negative binomial model is 
theoretically ambiguous since its assumptions can support a variety of probability 
mechanisms that might be producing the data generating process (dgp) 12. Because of this, 
although multivariate regression models based on the negative binomial distribution can be 
used to estimate the predictors of the distribution of crime victimisation by allowing for over-
dispersion (Osborn and Tseloni, 1998; Tseloni, 2006), there is not a unique specification of 
the dgp for the negative binomial model and hence the problem of identifying a general 
specification of the distribution of crime victimisation remains unresolved. 
 
 
There are two archetypical processes producing over-dispersion in count data (Cameron and 
Trivedi, 1998): first, a dynamic dependence between the occurrence of successive events 
which are reported by each respondent – what is termed here as event-dependency. Event-
dependency can be regarded as an instance of true contagion between victimisation 
experiences. The hypothetical illustration often used is where crime victimisation events 
occur over time in a series against a target (or victim) because they are committed by the 
same person, who returns to the scene on a number of occasions because he or she is attracted 
to the target in some way (Farrell et al., 1995). A second source of over-dispersion in the 
observed sample distribution is where there is unmeasured variability in a priori risk between 
respondents that affects the observed distribution in a systematic way – what is termed here 
as risk-heterogeneity. For example, two households reporting different frequencies of 
victimisation may possess different characteristics, signifying differential risk or 
vulnerability, that render them differentially prone to being victimised. This interpretation 
conforms more to the assumptions of the risk-exposure model. Thus, any repetition of 
victimisation over time for any individual may merely indicate separate occurrences (even if 
these consist of separate series or spells of victimisation occurrences) of a stable and 
persistent risk. Crucially, in the risk-heterogeneity interpretation, incidents occur randomly 
over time with no direct link between one incident and the next.  
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As Pease (1998) helpfully puts it, the repeat victimisation of a person or household over time 
may serve either as a flag for a stable probability of victimisation risk or indicate that 
victimisation events can serve to boost the likelihood of subsequent events over and above 
chance. Yet merely aggregating risk occurrences across heterogeneous individuals can yield 
an apparent contagion effect which is indistinguishable in cross-sectional data from the effect 
produced as if true contagion (event dependency) existed. So, despite the fit yielded by the 
negative binomial distribution, the underlying dgp cannot be identified, nor can true 
contagion (event-dependency), using only cross-sectional data (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). 
Both Nelson (1980) and (Sparks, 1981) rejected as implausible the idea that true contagion 
characterised the dgp since this would mean, contrary to the risk-exposure model, that 
everyone faced the same a priori risk. Nelson (1980) substantiated this recommendation by 
showing that the correlates of victimisation differed very little whether one used individual 
probabilities (i.e. whether a person will experience one or more victimisations over the recall 
period) or rates (the frequency-rate of victimisation over the period).   
 
Nevertheless, theoretically, the negative binomial distribution is capable of accommodating 
different mixtures of flag and boost processes (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). In particular, the 
hypothesis that victimisation is repeated by virtue of event-dependency has been justified 
more recently by arguments in terms of ‘routine situational risk-transmission’ (Hope et al., 
2001), primarily by hypothesising that re-victimisation is a consequence of re-visits by the 
same offender or his/her direct associates over the short-term (Farrell et al., 1995). In this, 
there is an attempt to incorporate elements of true contagion into the risk-exposure model.  
As Pease (see also Farrell et al., 1995) puts it:  
 
“…the key reasons for repeats are…the presence of good, and lack of bad, 
consequences of the first crime for the offender, and the stability of the situation 
which presents itself to an offender on the first and subsequent visits to the scene of 
his or her crime” (Pease, 1998: 6).  
 
Two pieces of evidence are often cited as suggestive of the existence of true contagion: first, 
analysis of aggregate recorded crime data appears to suggest a short time-period between 
offences, if they repeat (Polvi et al., 1990) 13; and second, series offences comprise a very 
large proportion of offences reported by victims to the British Crime Survey (Chenery et al., 
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1996)14. The emphasis on short-term, event-dependent repetition lends itself congenially to 
the application of immediate situational control methods of crime prevention (Laycock, 2001; 
Pease, 1998). 
 
Osborn and Tseloni (1998) were able to estimate a multivariate negative binomial model for 
the whole frequency-distribution of household property crimes using British Crime Survey 
(BCS) data with the assumption that over-dispersion  arises through unexplained risk-
heterogeneity. Using a priori risk factors identified from their model, they were able to 
predict the probabilities for the various frequency-levels of victimisation observed in the data. 
Comparisons of predictions from the negative binomial model were made with predictions 
derived from a simple Poisson model: for low levels of predicted a priori victimisation risk , 
the two distributions gave very similar results. However, for higher risk levels, the negative 
binomial model diverged from the Poisson model, more closely resembling the observed 
distribution of crime victimisation, with fewer victims than under a Poisson assumption but 
correspondingly more multiple-victim households (Osborn and Tseloni, 1998: 325), and 
suggesting a much better fit. They conclude that “…our models indicate that crime is more 
concentrated [on multiple victims] than random events would predict…the effect of this 
concentration is most marked for those whose household and area characteristics make them 
most vulnerable” (Osborn and Tseloni, 1998: 328).  
 
Nevertheless, despite further model refinement (Tesloni, 2006), the use of negative binomial 
regression methods cannot prove the presence of true contagion. That is to say, it does not 
imply that multiple victims are ‘repeat’ victims, in the sense that each event is dependent 
upon prior events. If anything, the reverse is more likely, since the model specification 
utilised in applications to date tests specifically for risk-heterogeneity and relegates any 
possible contagion effects to residual error 15. Even so, the limitations of cross-sectional data  
also limit efforts to test properly for the existence of event-dependency. In practice, while 
modelling refinements, such as those introduced by Tseloni (2006), can help further to 
identify the extent of risk-heterogeneity – for instance, by estimating the degree of 
unmeasured heterogeneity – by the same token they reduce further the possibility of event-
dependency. Thus, while considerable confidence can be had that the distribution of crime 
victimisation fits the negative binomial model, less can be said as to which generalisation of 
the model is the most appropriate description of the underlying process generating the 
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distribution, even though the success of the risk-heterogeneity version to date reduces support 
for true event-dependent (i.e. repeat victimisation) contagion (Tseloni and Pease, 2003). 
 
Vulnerability 
 
Nevertheless, even if there may be no event-dependent link between incidents, that does not 
mean that the occurrence of events are not related, though the mechanism linking them may 
reside in the biography or ‘life-course’ of the victim – including relationships with others – 
rather than intrinsically in the victimisation events themselves (Hope et al., 2001). Risk-
transmission via the life-course becomes more persuasive when incidents are contextualised 
as part of people’s lives – for example, when they re-occur over the longer-term, or reoccur in 
variant or generic situations, or are clearly part of a long-term life-course attribute, such as a 
cohabiting relationship. In a ‘life-course’ explanation, the ‘carrier’ of risk is the victim. 
People might become vulnerable to crime victimisation by virtue of some predisposing risk-
factors acquired early on, which renders them abnormally and persistently vulnerable to 
being victimised during their subsequent life-course16. This view of vulnerability, however, 
lends itself too readily to the reification of unwarranted and immeasurable traits such as 
victim-proneness, which logically must precede any instance of victimisation, must constitute 
a prior cause of subsequent victimisation but which must not be defined by reference to them. 
Here, again, problems are raised by the difficulty in deciding upon what would be an 
appropriate counter-factual condition for  life-course victim-vulnerability.  
 
Immunity 
 
In preference, the continuing occurrence of incidents that persistently instantiate the victims’ 
vulnerability may eventually become part of victims’ biographies. Regular experiences of 
victimisation may shape their life-course to such a degree that crime victimisation itself 
becomes part of the ‘normal’ pattern of their everyday lives (Genn, 1988). These patterns 
may then continue into the future, unless and until something happens to rupture the expected 
life-course – for example, the abused woman leaves the abusive relationship, or the 
victimised household moves to a safer neighbourhood. Yet while they remain in such 
victimising circumstances, victims will simply continue to experience victimisation. The 
frequency of which being largely in the hands of offenders.  So, while the concept of risk-
exposure has been deployed to account for the onset of crime victimisation, the possibility of 
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life-course persistence (duration) calls, in turn, for an explanation also of the cessation of 
victimisation. 
  
Hope and Trickett (2004) propose an immunity model to explain the dgp driving the observed 
micro-level frequency distribution. Rather than see ‘repeat victimisation’ as a consequence of 
excessive selective exposure to crime risk  – primarily selection by prolific offenders (Pease, 
1998) – frequent (multiple) victimisation could also reflect certain victims’ inability to 
remove themselves  from risk, by virtue of their relative powerlessness to change their life-
circumstances. In support of the concept of powerlessness, Hope et al., (2001), found that 
multiple crime-type victims experienced also other forms of social vulnerability – such as 
suffering a domestic fire in the past two years (also a rare occurrence) – and were also more 
likely to be younger adults, living with children, renting from the local (social) housing 
authority and living in poorer, urban areas. Thus multiple victims shared many of the social 
characteristics of economically marginal social groups – sectors of society that are also likely 
to suffer other misfortunes, including ill-health. 
 
 Yet, unlike many forms of ill-health, the source of crime victimisation risk (i.e. motivated 
offenders) comes primarily from victims’ environments. Thus very vulnerable residents in 
high-risk environments continue to be victimised because they are unable to attain immunity 
– that is, to remove or protect themselves from risk within those environments. Rather than 
being selected specifically for repeat victimisation on the basis of prior victimisation (Pease, 
1998), victims in these environments may only appear to have a non-random probability of 
repeat crime victimisation over time because they are more likely to remain unprotected in an 
environment where the probability of victimisation itself remains high and constant. Their 
contagiousness is apparent rather than true. In contrast, those who have attained ‘immunity’  
by virtue of their removal from risk have a censored (negative) exposure to crime risk – that 
is, they are no longer eligible for selection as victims and thus unavailable to register at 
higher frequency levels. Thus, while repeat victims do not possess any additional risk factors 
that mark out their excessive risk (Osborn et al., 1996), their continued vulnerability may 
indicate an (as yet unmeasured) incapacity to remove themselves from risk; while the 
category of non-victims may mask a variety of types of immunity, again unmeasured 17. As 
such, powerlessness to avoid the probability of exposure may allow the conceptualisation of 
negative values of risk that are missing from the more positive conception of exposure 
discussed above. 
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As described in most of its technical reports, the Primary Sampling Unit (PSU) of the BCS 
(however it has been defined) is a nested cluster sample of respondents living in close, spatial 
proximity to each other. From these it is possible to aggregate individual responses according 
to the strata and clusters present within the BCS sampling structure – for instance, to form 
‘pseudo-neighbourhoods’ based on such clusters. Trickett et al. (1992) estimated expected 
prevalence from observed prevalence rates, over the deciles of the distribution of pseudo-
neighbourhood crime victimisation rates for both personal and household property crime 
victimisation. As illustrated in Figure 1, observed prevalence rates differed significantly from 
that expected, over all decile groups, though dramatically so in higher rate areas 18.  
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Their analysis implied that significantly fewer people are victimised than would be 
anticipated if the chance of crime victimisation was distributed randomly amongst the 
population. Yet neither is this likely to be random selection: while the disparity described in 
Figure 1 has been interpreted as evidence of excessive exposure of a minority of people 
(repeat victims), it can also be seen just as easily as indicating a non-random prevalence of 
immunity (i.e. non-victimisation) amongst other residents. Thus ‘what is different about high 
crime areas’ is not only non-random repeat victimisation but also non-random immunity.  
The possible non-random co-presence of both immune and chronic groups within the same 
risk producing environment has not hitherto greatly influenced either theory or policy. Even 
so, it is possible that the social environment of any high crime community may be composed 
at any one time of a segmented order comprising both the extremely vulnerable and the 
highly immune. The resulting neighbourhood risk environment may reflect the outcome of 
‘conflicting forces’ of exposure and immunity – a process documented during a crime 
reduction ‘experiment’ in Hope and Foster (1992) - resulting in a particular macro-level 
pattern of crime-flux (Hope, 1995) and a distinctive micro-level frequency distribution.  
 
Very little is known about either the varieties of immunity or the forms of relationship 
between immune and victimised groups or, needless to say, how these relationships shape the 
data generating process of observed crime victimisation distributions. Some people, e.g. the 
elderly, may be immune because they are never exposed to risk, or because of moral 
inhibition (see Clarke et al., 1985). Some may be immune to victimisation because they are 
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themselves offenders, or members of family networks,  capable of retribution should they be 
attacked. And some people may be victimised excessively because they do not conform to the 
prevailing culture, or because they ‘stand-out’ in some way (Walklate and Evans, 1999). In 
any event, detailed ethnography reveals a variegated, micro-social pattern of group relations, 
social networks and contrasting cultures that warns against reliance upon a ‘black box’ 
conceptualisation of the environment of crime victimisation19. Whatever the 
conceptualisation, it seems likely that all victims have relationships of one kind or another 
with the sources of their victimisation risk, even if these are not intimate or identifiable. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Crime victimisation is conceptualised as a phenomenon that is embedded in everyday life. 
‘Victims’ are members of populations in society and experience victimisation while being 
‘normal’. Nevertheless, the empirical study of crime victims, especially derived from 
population sample surveys, has suffered from the illusion of actuality fostered by the ‘real’ 
and ‘normal’ appearance of these data. It is not as though such data were not real themselves 
nor that they do not represent real phenomena but that the embbededness of victimisation in 
everyday life makes it hard, if not impossible, to abstract crime victimisation so that its true 
causes and processes might be observed. Victimisation is defined by its observed actual 
occurrence which makes it impossible to observe the data generating processes that underlie 
the production of these observations, including continuous processes of risk that might be 
inherent in victimisation. And it is also impossible to observe the counterfactual conditions 
that give meaning to the factual condition of crime victimisation. In sum, we are hindered in 
explanation because we cannot observe non-victimisation in the same way that we observe 
victimisation and we cannot therefore observe the complete manifestation of the 
phenomenon.  
 
Nevertheless, the positive perspective has dominated empirical work, leading analysts too 
readily to interpret observations as positive evidence of crime victimisation – especially, that 
crime victimisation is a product of exposure to abnormal risk, and that victims deviate from 
the normal condition. Yet efforts to apply statistical models to the data reveal problems and 
difficulties with the approach, in part because positive data is being used to prove the normal 
condition – non-victimisation – which, paradoxically, is defined by its absence, or as an 
unobservable negative. It may be impossible to overcome the limits to observing the data 
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generating process  of crime victimisation.  Operational research efforts to abstract 
victimisation from everyday life risk both selection bias and artificiality. But equally so does 
unreflexive ‘realism’ based on direct observation. The only viable research strategy, then, is 
to work with the observations of crime victimisation that we are able to gather but to 
approach these in a fundamentally reflexive and hypothetical manner. And this requires 
careful attention to how we frame and test our hypotheses, not just about the facts of 
victimisation that we can observe but also about the necessary counterfactuals, which we 
must infer.  
 
FURTHER READING 
 
Many of the sources for this chapter are contained in the references, though these tend to be 
in the form of rather technical academic journal articles. Somewhat dated books concerning 
analyses of victimisation survey data include:  R. F. Sparks, H. Genn, and D. Dodd Surveying 
Victims. (1977, London: Wiley); M. S. Hindelang, M. Gottfredson, and J. Garofalo Victims 
of Violent Crime. (1978, Cambridge, MA.: Ballinger); and T. D. Miethe and R. F. Meier 
Crime and Its Social Context. ((1994, Albany, NY: SUNY Press). A useful textbook, again 
somewhat dated, is C. Coleman, and J. Moynihan  Understanding Crime Data. (1996 
Buckingham: Open University Press).  
 
More recent overview chapters on crime surveys are: P. Mayhew (2000). ‘Researching the 
state of crime: local, national and international victim surveys’ (in R.D. King and E. Wincup 
(Eds.). Doing Research on Crime and Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press); and T. Hope 
(2005). ‘What do crime statistics tell us?’ (in C. Hale, K. Hayward, A. Wahidin and E. 
Wincup (Eds.). Criminology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Details about the British 
Crime Survey can be found in annual reports published in the Home Office Statistical 
Bulletin series (http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pubsstatistical.html). Information on the 
social and political context of crime victimisation surveys in Britain can be found in Crime 
Statistics: User Perspectives. Statistics Commission Report No. 30, 2006 (London: Statistics 
Commission. www.statscom.org.uk ). 
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TABLE 1A 
 
Recalled-frequency crime distributions, previous 12 
months – British Crime Survey (2002/03) 
General adult population (percentages) 
 
 
 Proportion of 
Non-victims in 
population 
Proportion of 
victims 
experiencing 
two or more 
incidents 
Property   
Burglary – 
households 
96.6 18 
Vehicle-related 
theft – vehicle 
owning 
households 
89.2 19 
Violence   
Mugging  99.9 10 
Stranger  98.4 21 
Acquaintance 98.6 28 
Domestic 99.4 45 
 
Notes 
Adults in the BCS are persons over 15 years of age. 
Source: Simmons and Dodd (ed) HOSB 07/03 
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TABLE 1B 
 
Recalled-frequency domestic violence distributions, 
previous 12 months – British Crime Survey (2001) 
Adult women (percentages) 
 
 Proportion of 
Non-victims 
amongst adult 
women 
Proportion of 
victims 
experiencing 
two or more 
incidents 
Domestic 
violence – 
threat or force 
95.8 72 
Domestic force  
 
96.6 68 
- minor 97.4 63 
- severe 98.4 73 
 
Source: Walby and Allen (2004) 
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Figure 1 
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Notes 
                                                 
1
 Counterfactual theories of causation have emerged as (arguably) a more useful way of 
conceptualising causation than the traditional Humean empirical regularity approach, 
particularly for observable phenomena. As Menzies (2001) puts it, the basic idea of 
counterfactual theories is that “…the meaning of a singular causal claim of the form “Event c 
caused event e” can be explained in terms of counterfactual conditionals of the form “If c had 
not occurred, e would not have occurred” (Menzies, 2001). Increasing interest in, and use of, 
counterfactual reasoning is occurring, for example, in the cognate fields of epidemiology (e.g. 
Maldano and Greenland, 2002), micro-econometrics (Heckman, 2001), quantitative sociology 
(e.g. Harding, 2003) and, recently, criminology (Sampson et al., 2006). 
 
2
 For example, no hereditable proneness to crime victimisation has yet been identified. 
 
3
 Presumably due to the point made above, that much data is collected for other primary 
purposes, for example, in the case of national victimisation surveys such as the British Crime 
Survey, to estimate annual (cross-sectional) prevalence and incidence rates for its jurisdiction 
(England and Wales). 
4
 For example, competition for questionnaire space with apparently more ‘policy-relevant’ 
variables. 
5
 Specifically, national victimisation surveys such as the British Crime Survey (BCS) sample 
representative adult populations of permanent residence. In the case of the BCS, respondents 
are aged 16 years or over and answer questions about themselves and their households. 
Respondents are selected using a complex multi-stage sample design and are interviewed in 
person using Computer Assisted Personal Interviewing (CAPI) techniques. 
6
 Referred to in the econometrics literature as ‘discrete choice’ models. 
7
 "…the probability that a violation will occur at any specific time and place might be taken 
as a function of the convergence of likely offenders and suitable targets in the absence of 
capable guardians (1979:590)". 
 
8
 Marsh (1982) disparages such an approach as ‘face-sheet sociology’. 
9
 These could either be similar or different to hypothetical unmeasured differences 
distinguishing generally victims from non-victims. These possibilities have been explored 
recently using US National Crime Victimisation Survey data by Tseloni and Pease (2003).  
10
 Which are further compounded by the problems of ‘experimentation’ noted above. 
11
 Indeed, this has been the paramount project of feminist victimology 
12
 Cameron and Trivedi (1998: 102) cite thirteen distinct stochastic mechanisms. 
13
 Although this assumption has been questioned by employment of alternative stochastic 
models (Spellman, 1995). 
14
 A ‘series offence’ is defined in the British Crime Survey by respondents answering the 
question ‘were any of these very similar incidents, when the same thing was done under the 
same circumstances and probably by the same people?’ 
15
 i.e. implementation as a risk-heterogeneity model – a characterisation of the Negative 
Binomial as a Poisson-gamma mixture (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998; Tseloni, 2006; Osborn 
and Tseloni, 1998). 
16
 Of course, this approach has been adopted by developmental perspectives on offending. 
17
 This interpretation is consistent with a compound-Poisson specification of the negative 
binomial distribution (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998) which has been found via multivariate 
modelling to have both a good fit to the micro-level distribution (Osborn and Tseloni, 1998), 
and to indicate substantial unmeasured risk-heterogeneity in the population (Tseloni, 2006). 
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18
 This finding was replicated using data from the 1988 BCS (Trickett et al., 1995). 
19
 See Merry (1981); Foster and Hope (1993); Walklate and Evans (1999) 
